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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO 
REQUEST THAT PROSPECTIVE JUROR PROGESS BE 
DISMISSED FOR CAUSE OR FOR FAILING TO REMOVE HIM 
BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
The State argues that "trial counsel did not deny Mr. 
Jacobsen of his Sixth Amendment1 right to the effective assistance 
of counsel by failing to request that prospective juror Progess be 
dismissed . . . ." See Brief of Appellee, p. 6. In support, the 
State claims that this Court should presume trial counsel's 
failure to remove Progess to be effective representation. Id. at 
p. 7. The record on appeal controverts both assertions. 
Ordinarily, the appellate court presumes that trial counsel's 
lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was 
the result of a plausibly justifiable conscious choice or 
preference. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Nevertheless, this presumption of 
effectiveness is rebuttable by a defendant showing any of the 
following: (1) that trial counsel was so inattentive or 
indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to 
remove a prospective juror was not the product of a conscious 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that Mi]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
1 
choice or preference; (2) that a prospective juror expressed bias 
so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing 
subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror; 
or (3) that there is some other specific evidence clearly 
demonstrating that trial counsel's choice was not plausibly 
justifiable. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f25, 12 P.3d 92. 
A defendant demonstrates actual inattentiveness or indifference by 
proving either "a specific and clear example of inattentiveness 
that directly caused the failure to object to a particular juror, 
or else show[ing] that counsel generally failed to participate in 
a meaningful way in the process as a whole." See id. at |^25 n.10; 
see also State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, Hl9, 153 P.3d 804. 
The record on appeal in the instant case substantiates both a 
specific and clear example of trial counsel's inattentiveness and 
inattentiveness in the process as a whole. 
The record demonstrates that trial counsel was so inattentive 
or indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure 
to remove Progess was not the result of a conscious choice or 
preference. Except for trial counsel's brief introduction of 
himself to the jury, he made no effort, whatsoever, to object or 
otherwise comment during any of jury selection proceedings. Cf. 
Litherland, 2000 UT App 274 at 127 (noting the active 
participation of counsel in the jury selection process). 
2 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the jury selection 
proceedings, as a whole, demonstrate that there were no other 
subjective strategic judgments that could have been exercised by 
trial counsel other than the removal of Progess as a prospective 
juror.2 The removal of Progess from the jury should have been 
obvious in light of the trial court's dismissal of other 
prospective jurors during jury selection. For instance, 
prospective juror Bart Alan Munson informed the trial court that 
he had worked with several Farmington City police, and that he is 
close friends with others from the sheriff's office (R. 117:22:12-
15). The court then asked Munson if he would "be more inclined at 
this stage to give their testimony more credibility simply because 
they're with the Davis County Sheriff's Office?", to which Munson 
2In the course of jury selection, the trial court asked the 
prospective jurors whether any of them have close friends or family 
members that work in law enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). Progess 
responded that he had a "close friend that's on the Utah Highway 
Patrol." (R. 117:21:14-15). The trial court asked Progess if he 
would "be inclined to give more credibility to a police officer who 
testifies as opposed to a lay witness in court." (R. 117:22:1-3). 
Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd give more credibility, but I 
think they probably pay attention to detail a little bit more than 
the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6). The trial court then inquired, 
"At this stage of the proceedings, would your tendency be to favor 
the prosecution over the defense? (R. 117:22:7-8). Progess 
responded, "No." (R. 117:22:9). The trial court, contrary to the 
questioning utilized with other prospective jurors, pursued no 
further questioning. The final six individuals selected to sit on 
the jury included Progess (R. 117:39:14-16), who not only sat on the 
jury but ultimately served as the foreperson of the jury that 
convicted Mr. Jacobsen (R. 57). 
3 
responded, "I don't think so." (R. 117:22:17-20). The trial court 
further questioned Munson as follows: xxIf you were seated here at 
defense table as the defendant, and somebody is in the jury with 
a close relationship between an agency who will be testifying in 
that trial, would you be uncomfortable?" (R. 117:23:6-9). Munson 
responded, uYeah, I think so.", after which the court summarily 
excused Munson (R. 117:23:10-14). 
Additionally, the trial court released prospective juror 
Jessica R. Carlos upon being informed that she could "possibly" be 
influenced by the fact that her brother-in-law is an officer for 
Sunset City (R. 117:26:11-25). Had trial counsel made the 
appropriate objection, the trial court, based on questioning 
utilized with other prospective jurors, would have erred by not 
removing Progess. See also R. 117:27:4-12 (trial court's 
questioning and release of prospective juror Johnson); R. 117:30-
31 (trial court's questioning and excusing of prospective juror 
Northrop).3 
Trial counsel's failure to request that Progess be removed 
for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request that 
3The critical portion of the jury selection proceedings is 
attached as Addendum C to the Brief of Appellant. 
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Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him by 
peremptory challenge, the result at trial would have been 
different. 
II. THE JURY SELECTION RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO 
PURSUE QUESTIONING AND DISMISSAL OF PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR PROGESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF OTHER PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS. 
The State argues that the trial court did not commit plain 
error by not pursuing the dismissal of Progess similar to that of 
other prospective jurors. See Brief of Appellee, p. 11. However, 
the record on appeal demonstrates otherwise. 
The trial court in the case at bar failed to pursue further 
questioning of and the dismissal of prospective juror Progess even 
though the trial court pursued further questioning of and 
dismissal of other prospective jurors under similar circumstances. 
This error should have been obvious in light of the trial court's 
further questioning and dismissal of other prospective jurors 
during jury selection. For example, prospective juror Bart Alan 
Munson apprised the trial court that he had worked with several 
Farmington City police officers, and that he is close friends with 
others from the sheriff's office (R. 117:22:12-15). The court 
asked him if he would "be more inclined at this stage to give 
their testimony more credibility simply because they're with the 
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Davis County Sheriff's Office?" (R. 117:22:17-19). Munson 
responded, "I don't think so." (R. 117:22:20). Notwithstanding, 
the trial court questioned Munson further by asking, "If you were 
seated here at defense table as the defendant, and somebody is in 
the jury with a close relationship between an agency who will be 
testifying in that trial, would you be uncomfortable?" (R. 
117:23:6-9). Munson responded, "Yeah, I think so.", after which 
the court summarily excused Munson (R. 117:23:10-14). Moreover, 
the trial court released prospective juror Jessica R. Carlos upon 
being informed that she could "possibly" be influenced by the fact 
that her brother-in-law is an officer for Sunset City (R. 
117:26:11-25). The error was harmful because the trial court's 
failure to pursue further questioning as it did with other jurors 
denied Mr. Jacobsen of his right to due process as well as his 
right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Jacobsen respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse and remand this case to the trial 
6 
court for a new trial consistent with this Court's instructions 
set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /jf day of August, 2007 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C 
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7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
the following on this Jj\ day of August, 2007: 
Mr. Brandon L. Poll 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84 02 5 
Counsel for the State oA &tah 
8 
ADDENDA 
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